[This article is an excerpt from Dark Clouds at Dawn : A Political Memoir by Said Zahari, published by INSAN, 2001.]
By Said Zahari
Ibrahim Fikri and the Utusan Melayu
The “general” who led the attack to seize power at the Utusan Melayu office in Jalan Chan Sow Lin around the middle of 1961 was Ibrahim Fikri, an UMNO stalwart from Terengganu. He came to my office to declare war.
For some time, the atmosphere was already tense at the Utusan Melayu office, especially in the Editorial Department. We were expecting action by the Board of Directors, now completely controlled by a few UMNO individuals. Still, we clung to the hope that a solution could be found to preserve the Utusan Melayu’s independence.
We only wanted to ensure that Utusan Melayu would continue to be an independent national newspaper, not controlled by any political party. Our stand was that only an Utusan Melayu that was free from such control could truly serve religion, country and all the Malay people, not just a handful in a political party. Only with a free policy could Utusan Melayu be the voice of the people, fighting for the interests of the people with sincerity, integrity and courage.
But Ibrahim Fikri, who represented a few individuals in UMNO and was close to Tunku Abdul Rahman’s government, wanted the Utusan Melayu to be something totally different. The Utusan Melayu should belong to UMNO and should only serve that political party.
On the day Ibrahim Fikri walked into my office to hand me his four-pronged surrender “terms”, I knew that the Utusan Melayu, the independent national newspaper for more than two decades, was dead. What lived on was a bogus Utusan Melayu. However, Ibrahim Fikri never expected that the entire Utusan Melayu staff would be outraged by his arrogance.
The four-pronged policy Ibrahim Fikri handed me was as follows :
- Give full support to the ruling party, as this would be more profitable commercially.
- Publish factually accurate news but limit news headlines for other parties.
- Publish more news reports under big headlines about all Alliance ministers, where possible, including important policy statements.
- Support the Alliance when an action had already been taken, and offer constructive criticism when a bad decision was made.
My colleagues and I saw the four-pronged policy as being directly contradictory to the 1939 pledge. Clearly, the policy was aimed at curbing the freedom and discretion of the editors and other journalists in the effective performance of their duties.
The entire Utusan Melayu staff from all three departments – administration, printing and editorial – quickly convened a meeting and resolved not to give in. An Action Committee was formed comprising Tajuddin Kahar, Kajai, Usman Awang, Ikhsan Kastawi, Rosedin Yaacub and Zailani Sulaiman who, among other duties, were in charge of various sub-committees. The Printing Workers Union, Utusan Melayu Branch, held an emergency meeting and decided to go on strike.
In the middle of all this, I received a letter from the Board of Directors giving me a directive to move to the Utusan Melayu office in Singapore. The Action Committee regarded this as victimisation and a slap in the face for the Action Committee. I was therefore advised not to obey the directive. I took the advice.
Meanwhile, the Action Committee sent an ultimatum to the Board of Directors, demanding the withdrawal of the four-pronged policy and the directive transferring me to the Singapore office. When the Board of Directors rejected the Action Committee’s demands, the strike was launched on 21 July 1961.
The management ordered the Utusan Melayu building locked up, and the strikers decided to camp outside. I contacted Yaacob Latif, Director of the Information department, to request a telephone line to our strike camp, On the same day, their workers came to install a telephone for us. Tongkat (Usman Awang) who headed the Information Committee, assisted by Rosedin Yaakub, set up their “information office” comprising of a desk, a typewriter and the newly installed telephone.
From that day too, the strikers’ “Information department” published a bulletin, “Siaran Mogok”, and managed to come out with 20 issues before the government’s Information Ministry and the police stopped the publication. Our telephone too was withdrawn. However, the fight went on until the end of the strike on 21 October.
Banned from Entering Malaya
Despite many obstacles and difficulties, the strikers’ solidarity remained firm for more than a month. After that, however, various developments began to undermine it. Tunku Abdul Rahman’s government showed its true colours, coming out openly in support of the Utusan Melayu management.
In his capacity as Foreign Minister of Malaya, Tunku issued an order permanently prohibiting me from entering Malaya. The order was handed to me when I arrived in Johor Bahru on my way to Kuala Lumpur after visiting the strikers in Singapore on 2 September 1961. I was ordered to turn back to Singapore. From that day on, I lost contact with the strikers’ camp in Jalan Chan Sow Lin.
The order, dated 30 August 1961, read as follows : “Under Section 9 of the Immigration Ordinance, 1959, I hereby by order prohibit permanently the entry into the Federation of Malaya Said Zahari, a citizen of Singapore, formerly of Utusan Melayu Press, Kuala Lumpur.”
While I was banned from Malaya, rifts began to develop among the strikers. It was as if there was a conspiracy of treachery timed to occur then. A number of strikers suddenly defected, abandoning their colleagues.
Samani Mohd Amin was a reporter for Utusan Melayu at the time of the strike. In his notes on the Utusan Melayu strike, to be published as a book, among other things, he wrote : “A day after Said Zahari went to Singapore on strike business, Rosedin disappeared. One day, I bumped into Rosedin who whispered to me, ‘some friends including Samad Ismail asked me to leave the strike.’”
Again, according to Samani’s notes: “Salleh Yusof also suggested to Rosedin that we leave the strike because its leadership was in disarray after Said Zahari was cut off far away in Singapore.”
Unknown to me then, Samani had been told a lot about Ibrahim Fikri’s plans some months before the strike. At one time, he later said, Salleh Yusof, who was also an Utusan Melayu reporter, asked him to go to the Rest House in the Lake Gardens. Ibrahim Fikri was waiting there to have lunch with them. “Over lunch, Ibrahim said that there would be major changes in Utusan Melayu, in administration and editorial policy, to be in line with UMNO policy and strategy.” Samani’s notes continue : “A week after the strike began, Salley asked me to see Ibrahim Fikri again. This time, Ibrahim advised me to get out of the strike as it would be no good and was bound to be crushed by UMNO. Ibrahim Fikri cited the case of Said Zahari being transferred to Singapore as proof of UMNO’s power.”
Samani wrote further : “About three weeks after that, Salleh asked me to go to the Residency. ‘Important’, said Salleh. Tunku wanted to discuss the strike. At the Residency, I was met by Nik Hassan, Tunku’s private secretary, and Ibrahim Fikri. Then, Tunku came out and we had a discussion with him. In one corner, I saw Samad Ismail. He did not join in the discussion. He only watched from afar. Tunku advised me ’Don’t be a fool, following stubborn people, going on strike…going against the government…going against UMNO…trying to ruin a Malay company…some one like you, Samani, shouldn’t join then…why would you want to hang in there any longer?’’”
In reply, Samani wrote, he told Tunku that he too was a Malay, had shares in the Utusan Melayu and was not against UMNO. He reiterated his stand that he did not want the Utusan Melayu to be a mere tool of UMNO when there were many Malays in other parties like Party Negara, PAS, Partai Rakyat and a great number not belonging to any party.
“I said I was firm in my stand that Utusan Melayu should remain the voice of the Malays, the channel for their ideas, and not be shackled in the interests of a particular party. Tunku cast a sidelong glance at Samad Ismail and, after a few moments, Tunku said with a disappointed and angry look : ‘Think carefully. Don’t regret it an become a hantu raya (a spirit kept as a bodyguard) by leaving us!’”
Thus were Samani’s notes of a certain chapter in the story of the 1961 Utusan Melayu strike.
[This article is an excerpt from Dark Clouds at
Dawn : A Political Memoir by Said Zahari, published by INSAN, 2001.]
Ibrahim Fikri and the Utusan Melayu
The “general” who led the attack to seize power at the Utusan
Melayu office in Jalan Chan Sow Lin around the middle of 1961 was Ibrahim
Fikri, an UMNO stalwart from Terengganu. He came to my office to declare war.
For some time, the atmosphere was already tense at the Utusan Melayu office,
especially in the Editorial Department. We were expecting action by the Board
of Directors, now completely controlled by a few UMNO individuals. Still, we
clung to the hope that a solution could be found to preserve the Utusan
Melayu’s independence.
We only wanted to ensure that Utusan Melayu would continue to be an
independent national newspaper, not controlled by any political party. Our
stand was that only an Utusan Melayu that was free from such control could
truly serve religion, country and all the Malay people, not just a handful in a
political party. Only with a free policy could Utusan Melayu be the voice of
the people, fighting for the interests of the people with sincerity, integrity
and courage.
But Ibrahim Fikri, who represented a few individuals in UMNO and was close
to Tunku Abdul Rahman’s government, wanted the Utusan Melayu to be something
totally different. The Utusan Melayu should belong to UMNO and should only
serve that political party.
On the day Ibrahim Fikri walked into
my office to hand me his four-pronged surrender “terms”, I knew that the Utusan
Melayu, the independent national newspaper for more than two decades, was dead.
What lived on was a bogus Utusan Melayu. However, Ibrahim Fikri never expected
that the entire Utusan Melayu staff would be outraged by his arrogance.
The four-pronged policy Ibrahim Fikri handed me was as
follows :
1.
Give full support to the ruling party, as this
would be more profitable commercially.
2.
Publish factually accurate news but limit news
headlines for other parties.
3.
Publish more news reports under big headlines
about all Alliance ministers, where possible, including important policy
statements.
4.
Support the Alliance when an action had already
been taken, and offer constructive criticism when a bad decision was made.
My colleagues and I saw the four-pronged policy as being
directly contradictory to the 1939 pledge. Clearly, the policy was aimed at
curbing the freedom and discretion of the editors and other journalists in the
effective performance of their duties.
The entire Utusan Melayu staff from all three departments –
administration, printing and editorial – quickly convened a meeting and resolved
not to give in. An Action Committee was formed comprising Tajuddin Kahar,
Kajai, Usman Awang, Ikhsan Kastawi, Rosedin Yaacub and Zailani Sulaiman who,
among other duties, were in charge of various sub-committees. The Printing
Workers Union, Utusan Melayu Branch, held an emergency meeting and decided to
go on strike.
In the middle of all this, I received a letter from the
Board of Directors giving me a directive to move to the Utusan Melayu office in
Singapore. The Action Committee regarded this as victimisation and a slap in
the face for the Action Committee. I was therefore advised not to obey the
directive. I took the advice.
Meanwhile, the Action Committee sent an ultimatum to the
Board of Directors, demanding the withdrawal of the four-pronged policy and the
directive transferring me to the Singapore office. When the Board of Directors
rejected the Action Committee’s demands, the strike was launched on 21 July
1961.
The management ordered the Utusan Melayu building locked up,
and the strikers decided to camp outside. I contacted Yaacob Latif, Director of
the Information department, to request a telephone line to our strike camp, On
the same day, their workers came to install a telephone for us. Tongkat (Usman
Awang) who headed the Information Committee, assisted by Rosedin Yaakub, set up
their “information office” comprising of a desk, a typewriter and the newly
installed telephone.
From that day too, the strikers’ “Information department”
published a bulletin, “Siaran Mogok”, and managed to come out with 20 issues
before the government’s Information Ministry and the police stopped the publication.
Our telephone too was withdrawn. However, the fight went on until the end of
the strike on 21 October.
Banned from Entering Malaya
Despite many obstacles and difficulties, the strikers’
solidarity remained firm for more than a month. After that, however, various
developments began to undermine it. Tunku Abdul Rahman’s government showed its
true colours, coming out openly in support of the Utusan Melayu management.
In his capacity as Foreign Minister of Malaya, Tunku issued
an order permanently prohibiting me from entering Malaya. The order was handed
to me when I arrived in Johor Bahru on my way to Kuala Lumpur after visiting
the strikers in Singapore on 2 September 1961. I was ordered to turn back to Singapore.
From that day on, I lost contact with the strikers’ camp in Jalan Chan Sow Lin.
The order, dated 30 August 1961, read as follows : “Under
Section 9 of the Immigration Ordinance, 1959, I hereby by order prohibit
permanently the entry into the Federation of Malaya Said Zahari, a citizen of
Singapore, formerly of Utusan Melayu Press, Kuala Lumpur.”
While I was banned from Malaya, rifts began to develop among
the strikers. It was as if there was a conspiracy of treachery timed to occur
then. A number of strikers suddenly defected, abanding their colleagues.
Samani Mohd Amin was a reporter for Utusan Melayu at the time
of the strike. In his notes on the Utusan Melayu strike, to be published as a
book, among other things, he wrote : “A day after Said Zahari went to Singapore
on strike business, Rosedin disappeared. One day, I bumped into Rosedin who
whispered to me, ‘some friends including Samad Ismail asked me to leave the
strike.’”
Again, according to Samani’s notes: “Salleh Yusof also
suggested to Rosedin that we leave the strike because its leadership was in
disarray after Said Zahari was cut off far away in Singapore.”
Unknown to me then, Samani had been told a lot about Ibrahim
Fikri’s plans some months before the strike. At one time, he later said, Salleh
Yusof, who was also an Utusan Melayu reporter, asked him to go to the Rest House
in the Lake Gardens. Ibrahim Fikri was waiting there to have lunch with them. “Over
lunch, Ibrahim said that there would be major changes in Utusan Melayu, in
administration and editorial policy, to be in line with UMNO policy and
strategy.” Samani’s notes continue : “A week after the strike began, Salley
asked me to see Ibrahim Fikri again. This time, Ibrahim advised me to get out
of the strike as it would be no good and was bound to be crushed by UMNO.
Ibrahim Fikri cited the case of Said Zahari being transferred to Singapore as
proof of UMNO’s power.”
Samani wrote further : “About three weeks after that, Salleh
asked me to go to the Residency. ‘Important’, said Salleh. Tunku wanted to
discuss the strike. At the Residency, I was met by Nik Hassan, Tunku’s private
secretary, and Ibrahim Fikri. Then, Tunku came out and we had a discussion with
him. In one corner, I saw Samad Ismail. He did not join in the discussion. He
only watched from afar. Tunku advised me ’Don’t be a fool, following stubborn
people, going on strike…going against the government…going against UMNO…trying
to ruin a Malay company…some one like you, Samani, shouldn’t join then…why
would you want to hang in there any longer?’’”
In reply, Samani wrote, he told Tunku that he too was a
Malay, had shares in the Utusan Melayu and was not against UMNO. He reiterated
his stand that he did not want the Utusan Melayu to be a mere tool of UMNO when
there were many Malays in other parties like Party Negara, PAS, Partai Rakyat
and a great number not belonging to any party.
“I said I was firm in my stand that Utusan Melayu should remain
the voice of the Malays, the channel for their ideas, and not be shackled in
the interests of a particular party. Tunku cast a sidelong glance at Samad
Ismail and, after a few moments, Tunku said with a disappointed and angry look
: ‘Think carefully. Don’t regret it an become a hantu raya (a spirit kept as a
bodyguard) by leaving us!’”
Thus were Samani’s notes of a certain chapter in the story
of the 1961 Utusan Melayu strike.